This systemic risk paper introduces inhomogeneous random financial networks (IRFNs). Such models are intended to describe parts, or the entirety, of a highly heterogeneous network of banks and their interconnections, in the global financial system. Both the balance sheets and the stylized crisis behaviour of banks are ingredients of the network model. A systemic crisis is pictured as triggered by a shock to banks' balance sheets, which then leads to the propagation of damaging shocks and the potential for amplification of the crisis, ending with the system in a cascade equilibrium. Under some conditions the model has "locally tree-like independence (LTI)", where a general percolation theoretic argument leads to an analytic fixed point equation describing the cascade equilibrium when the number of banks N in the system is taken to infinity. This paper focusses on mathematical properties of the framework in the context of Eisenberg-Noe solvency cascades generalized to account for fractional bankruptcy charges. New results including a definition and proof of the "LTI property" of the Eisenberg-Noe solvency cascade mechanism lead to explicit N = ∞ fixed point equations that arise under very general model specifications. The essential formulas are shown to be implementable via well-defined approximation schemes, but numerical exploration of some of the wide range of potential applications of the method is left for future work.
is the choice of a random graph distribution to model the "skeleton graph" of interconnections between banks. Typically in these models, the edges in these graphs are directed, by convention pointing from debtor to creditor bank. Some of the popular choices for the skeleton have been directed configuration graphs and scale-free graphs. For example, directed configuration graphs are constructed starting from a "degree distribution" that specifies the number of in and out-edges for each node. So-called inhomogeneous random graphs (IRGs), see Bollobás et al. (2007) and van der Hofstad (2016) , are a related class that have been introduced to systemic risk theory more recently in Detering et al. (2017) to capture the diversity of bank sizes, connectivity and types better than the directed configuration graphs normally assumed in this line of SR research.
The goal of this paper is to explore how inhomogeneous random financial networks (IRFNs), in other words RFNs whose skeletons are IRGs, comprising a diverse collection of bank types linked by random exposures, might behave when subjected to the types of crisis triggers and contagion mechanisms often considered in the SR literature. A general category of random financial networks will be introduced that consists of a connectivity "skeleton" drawn from the broad class of inhomogeneous random graphs, on which is defined a random collection of bank balance sheets and interbank exposures. Any large random shock that hits the system is likely to trigger a cascade sequence of secondary shocks converging to a cascade equilibrium that represents the final outcome of the crisis. This cascade mapping results from the cascade mechanism that encodes the deterministic behavioural rules banks are assumed to follow during the crisis.
IRFN models for any value of N can always be explored by pure simulation alone. Alternatively, like configuration graphs, sequences of IRGs parametrized by increasing N can be specified that have an important property called locally tree-like independence (LTI). As described in Bordenave (2016) and others, this property implies that the random graph sequence is "locally weakly convergent" as N → ∞ to a collection of connected Galton-Watson random trees. The LTI property of IRGs implies for example that for any k > 1, the density of cycles of length k in the graph goes to zero as N goes to infinity. Amini et al. (2016) and Detering et al. (2017) have proven for certain simpler cascade models on LTI sequences of random skeleton graphs that the large N asymptotics of the cascade equilibrium is determined by a fixed point of a scalar-valued function, whose value can be interpreted as an average default probability. The proof of such results typically makes use of a combinatorial theorem of Wormald (1999) , which is difficult to extend to the more complex situations considered in the present paper. However, the result itself makes intuitive sense in broader generality, because of two manifestations of the LTI property. First, the LTI property of the skeleton in these models implies it converges (in the "local weak" sense) to a collection of random trees. Second, an analogous LTI property can be defined for the cascade mapping itself, which has the meaning that a desired independence structure is exact on all finite random trees. These two properties combined lead to the limiting approximating cascade formulas and therefore it is not surprising that they are exact in the infinite size limit. In general, based on the symmetries of the Galton-Watson skeleton, these formulas can be shown to boil down to a fixed point equation for a monotonic function of a particular collection of variables. It is has been observed in Melnik et al. (2011) that such asymptotic formulas often seem to provide an "unreasonably effective approximation" of finite sized systems studied by simulation. We will follow this common thread in the SR literature, namely to determine the dependence on the number of banks N in the system, as N → ∞.
The main contributions of this paper are:
1. Introduction of the inhomogeneous random financial network (IRFN) framework, closely related to the modelling framework of Detering et al. (2017) , that provides a flexible and scalable architecture for modelling many of the complex network characteristics thought to be relevant to systemic risk. In particular, we will develop solvency cascade models for networks of banks with arbitrary types.
2. We present for the first time a cascade analysis for an economically important family of models extending the EN 2001 framework to include partial fractional recovery of defaulted interbank assets. We also formulate and prove a "locally tree-like independence property" for this class of solvency cascade mechanisms.
3.
A general characterization is provided for the first cascade step in IRFN default models, in the limit N → ∞.
4. The large N asymptotics for full solvency cascades that arise in IRFN models is explored. Tractable recursive formulas for cascade equilibria are formulated and conjectured to hold in the large N limit, based on the LTI property of both the IRFN itself and the cascade mechanism.
The IRFN construction provides two specific benefits compared to the "configuration graph" RFN constructions of Gai and Kapadia (2010) and Amini et al. (2016) . Firstly, bank type has a direct and basic financial interpretation: logically, a node's degree is dependent on its type. Type is a more intuitive and general notion than node degree, and better suited to SR modelling where edges and degrees are constantly changing while the type of node does not change. Bank types can encode an unlimited range of node characteristics. Secondly, bank type makes better financial sense than node degree as the conditioning random variables determining system dependencies. In our setting, assuming random balance sheets and exposures are independent conditioned on node types is better justified than assuming their independence conditioned on node degrees.
The large N arguments developed in this paper can be used to investigate properties that are likely to hold in a wide range of cascade models on large financial networks with the assumed inhomogeneous random graph structure. Such models go far beyond the small class of RFN models for which rigorous asymptotic results have been derived. The heuristic arguments presented here, although conjectural, will complement a well-developed strand of rigorous results in the literature surveyed by van der Hofstad (2016) , that relate percolation properties on random graphs to properties of branching processes. Thus this paper presents a road map to developing rigorous percolation methods to prove the conjectures developed in this paper.
Section 2 introduces the concept of inhomogeneous random financial networks (IRFNs). Also included in the section are some of the probabilistic tools we will use in cascade analysis on an IRFN. Section 3 explores two of the important cascade channels treated in the SR literature, namely solvency cascades and funding liquidity cascades, in terms of cascade mechanisms that are deterministic rules of behaviour banks are assumed to follow during a crisis. This section then focusses on the cascade mapping that results from a specific solvency cascade mechanism operating within the IRFN model. Certain consequences of the LTI property are demonstrated supporting the conjecture that some cascade models have a tractable analytic asymptotic N = ∞ form. Section 4 provides a brief exploration of some of the issues and the kind of data required to implement the IRFN cascade method for real networks. Finally, a concluding section discusses some of the important questions and next steps to address in order to better understand financial systemic risk.
Notation: For a positive integer N, [N] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , N}. For a random variable X, its cumulative distribution function (CDF), probability density function (PDF) and characteristic function (CF) will be denoted F X , ρ X = F ′ X , andf X respectively. For any event A, 1(A) denotes the indicator random variable, taking values in {0, 1}. Any collection of random variables X = (X 1 , X 2 , . . . ) generates a sigma-algebra (or informally "information set") denoted by σ(X). Landau's "big O" notation f (N ) = O(N α ) for some α ∈ R is used for a sequence f (N ) , N = 1, 2, . . . to mean that f (N ) N −α is bounded as N → ∞.
Defining IRFNs
The financial system at any moment in time will be represented by an object we call an inhomogeneous random financial network, or IRFN. This is the specification of a multidimensional random variable that captures two levels of structure. The primary level of the IRFN, called the skeleton graph, is the directed random graph with N nodes, which from now on we take to represent "banks", and whose directed edges represent the existence of a significant exposure of one bank to another. The secondary layer specifies the balance sheets of the banks, including the inter-bank exposures, conditioned on knowledge of the skeleton graph.
Inhomogeneity in the IRFN model derives from classifying banks by type. The collection of random bank types {T v } v∈[N ] will be assumed to completely determine the dependence structure of other random variables. In other words, conditional expectations with respect to the sigma-algebra σ(T ) := σ(T v , v ∈ [N]) will typically exhibit conditional independence.
Skeleton Graph
The skeleton graph is modelled as a directed inhomogeneous random graph (DIRG), generalizing Erdös-Renyi random graphs, in which directed edges are drawn independently between ordered pairs of banks, not with equal likelihood but with likelihood that depends on the bank types. This class has its origins in Chung and Lu (2002) and Britton et al. (2006) and has been studied in generality in Bollobás et al. (2007) . For further details about this class, please see the textbooks van der Hofstad (2016) or Hurd (2016) [Section 3.4 ]. The DIRG structure arises by the assumption that exposures between counterparties can be treated as independent Bernoulli random variables I vw defined for pairs of banks (v, w), with a probability that depends on their types T v , T w . 2. Edges: Directed edges correspond to the non-zero entries of the incidence matrix I. For each pair v = w ∈ [N], I vw is the indicator for w to be exposed to v, which is to say that v has borrowed from w. The collection of edge indicators I vw is an independent family of Bernoulli random variables, conditioned on the type vector T := (T v ) v∈ [N ] , with probabilities
, the probability mapping kernel, is assumed to be independent of N. It determines the likelihood that two banks v, w of the given types have an exposure edge from v to w. For consistency, we require that N − 1 ≥ max T,T ′ κ(T, T ′ ).
Balance Sheets and the Crisis Trigger
The additional fundamental assumption of the IRFN modeling framework is that the balance sheets for all banks are derivable from an independent collection of multivariate random variables, conditioned on the skeleton. For the types of cascade analysis presented here, balance sheets will be viewed at the coarse-grained resolution as shown in Table 1 .
Assets Liabilities
inter-bank assetsZ inter-bank debtX external illiquid assetsĀ external debtD external liquid assetsC,Ξ equityĒ,∆ Prior to the onset of the crisis, a bank v has a balance sheet that consists of nominal values of assets and liabilities [Z,Ā,C,X,D,Ē] (labelled by barred quantities), which correspond to the aggregated values of the contracts, valued as if all banks are solvent. Nominal values can also be considered book values or face values. Assets (loans and securities) and liabilities (debts) are decomposed into internal and external quantities depending on whether the counterparty is a bank or not. The internal assetsZ and liabilitiesX of the system can be decomposed into the collection of nominal exposuresΩ vw . Banks and institutions that are not part of the system under analysis are deemed to be part of the exterior, and their exposures are included as part of the external debts and assets. Finally, only two categories of external assets are considered. Fixed assets model the retail loan book and realize only a fraction of their value if liquidated prematurely while liquid assets include government treasury bills and the like that are assumed to be as liquid as cash. 
(2)
The independent components of the nominal balance sheet will be denoted byB
A crisis trigger at a moment in time, which we label by step n = 0, occurs when a shock δB = [δA, δC, δE] to the balance sheets is sufficiently severe to put some banks into a stressed state where not all of their balance sheet entries B (0) =B + δB are positive. For simplicity we assume δΩ = 0, Ω (0) =Ω. To maintain the convention that balance sheet entries are never negative, we introduce buffers in place ofC,Ē. The cash buffer Ξ
may now be negative, in which case the bank is said to be insolvent or, equivalently, bankrupt. In our general systemic risk modelling paradigm, the cascade that follows the crisis trigger will be viewed for n ≥ 0 as a step-wise dynamics for the collection of balance sheets B (n) v of the entire system as it tries to resolve these illiquid and insolvent banks. Now we make some pragmatic probabilistic assumptions about the initial balance sheet and exposure random variables at n = 0, conditioned on the vector of bank types T = (T v ) v∈ [N ] . Let us denote by σ(T ) the sigma-algebra generated by T .
Assumption 2 (Balance Sheets and Exposures). The secondary layer of an IRFN, the collection of initial balance sheets and exposures B (0) v ,Ω vw at step n = 0, are continuous random variables that are mutually independent, and independent of σ(I), conditioned on σ(T ).
For each bank
Note that A (0) v is a positive random variable whereas the buffers may be negative. The initially illiquid banks are those with Ξ (0) v < 0 and initially insolvent banks are those with ∆
In summary, a finite IRFN representing the system after a crisis trigger amounts to a collection of random variables (T, I, B (0) ,Ω) satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2.
Asymptotic Properties of IRFNs

Degree Distribution of the Skeleton Graph
One is often concerned with the number of counterparties of nodes in directed random graphs, in other words, the in-and out-degree distributions. In DIRG networks, the degree distributions have a natural Poisson mixture structure in the large N limit. By permutation symmetry, we need only consider bank 1 with arbitrary type T 1 = T , whose in/out degree is defined as the pair (d − 1 , d + 1 ) = N w=2 (I w1 , I 1w ), a sum of conditionally IID bivariate random variables. Each term has the identical bivariate conditional characteristic function
The conditional CF of (d − 1 , d + 1 ) is the N − 1 power of this function, and dropping higher order terms in N −1 this can be written
which displays simple asymptotic structure as N → ∞.
, is 2π-biperiodic on R 2 and has the N → ∞ limiting behaviour:f
This type of limit can be handled by the following technical lemma, proved in the Appendix.
⊓ ⊔
Thus, for different values of T , the conditional joint in/out degree distribution is always asymptotic to a bivariate Poisson distribution. Now, recall that a finite mixture of a collection of probability distribution functions is the probability formed by a convex combination. We can then see that under our simplification of a finite type space [M], the asymptotic unconditional in/out degree distribution of any bank is a finite mixture:
where each component has a bivariate Poisson distribution with Poisson parameters
The mixing variable is the bank-type T , with the mixing weights P(T ).
Proposition 1 is a manifestation of the locally tree-like property of IRFNs. Consider the limiting distribution of the interbank debtX 1 = w =1Ω w1 of a typical bank v = 1.
Proposition 3.
1. The characteristic function of the interbank debtX 1 of bank 1, conditioned on its bank-type T ∈ [M], has the N → ∞ limiting behaviour:
where convergence of the logarithm of (7) is in L 2 [0, ∞).
Any finite collection of interbank debt random variables
Proof. By the conditional independence of the factors, we have an exact formula valid for finite N:f (N )
Now, by applying Lemma 2 to logf
Comparison of equation (8) to the Lévy-Khintchin formula shows thatX is a positive compound Poisson random variable with a continuous jump measure dµ X (· | T ) on
It follows that the unconditional distribution ofX v is a mixture over T v of compound Poisson random variables, with mixing distribution P(T v ), including a positive probability
For part (2), note that the same proof implies that the joint conditional CF ofX 1 ,X 2 two banks will be given by
Similarly, for the joint conditional CF for any finite collection of banks.
The Galton-Watson Process
The result in Proposition 2 on the large N asymptotic degree distribution reflects the general principle discussed in Bordenave (2016) that a sequence of locally tree-like networks such as an IRG is always "locally weakly convergent" to a collection of connected Galton-Watson (GW) random trees. This has a well-defined meaning that the collection of nodes that can be reached from a given node of type T by following directed edges has the approximate structure of a branching process. We can interpret Proposition 2 as implying that the number of nodes of type T ′ that can be reached along single directed edges rooted at any node v with type T is a Poisson random variable X T ′ ,T with mean parameter P(T ′ )κ(T, T ′ ). Each subsequent one-step extension has the same underlying distribution, defining the branching process. These facts identify the offspring distribution of any node, conditioned on its type.
It is not hard to deduce that Z n,T ′ ,T , the number of n step directed paths rooted at the node v = 1 with type T and terminating in a node of type T ′ , is a random variable that will follow the recursion formula
with Z 1,T ′ ,T ∼ X T ′ ,T,1 . Here {Z n−1,T ′′ ,T , X T ′ ,T ′′ ,i } i∈Z + is a mutually independent collection of random variables and each X T ′′ ,T,i is identically Pois(P(T ′′ )κ(T, T ′′ )). We now provide a multi-type extension of the discussion of branching processes found in Hurd (2016) [Section 4.1] . Let G = (G 1 , . . . , G M ) : [0, 1] M → [0, 1] M denote the following probability generating function for the identically distributed multi-variate random variables X T ′ ,T,i : for a = (a 1 , . . . , a M ) and
From the GW recursion (12), one can verify that the probability generating functions H n = (H n,1 , . . . , H n,M ) : [0, 1] M → [0, 1] M for the multi-variate random variables Z n,T ′ ,T defined by
are given by the composition
The extinction probabilities for this GW process forms a vector ξ = (ξ T ) T ∈[M ] where ξ T := P[ ∃ n : Z n,T ′ ,T = 0 ∀ T ′ ]. For each n, define ξ n,T = P[Z n,T ′ ,T = 0 ∀ T ′ ] = H n,T (0). Since Z n−1,T ′ ,T = 0 ∀ T ′ , T implies Z n,T ′ ,T = 0 ∀ T ′ , T , the sequence ξ n = (ξ n,1 , ξ n,M ) is increasing, bounded and therefore converges to some value ξ ∈ [0, 1] M . Since ξ n = H n (0), ξ n = G(H n−1 (0)) = G(ξ n−1 ) .
Note also that G has G(1) = 1 and is continuous and increasing on [0, 1] M . Therefore, by continuity,
so ξ ∈ [0, 1] M is a fixed point, which we can also see is the least fixed point, of G. Since G is strictly convex everywhere, it can have at most two fixed points on the lattice [0, 1] M . From this discussion, one can deduce that a node with type T will have an infinite number of nodes in its forward cluster with probability 1 − ξ T , which will be non-zero for some T if the gradient ∇G at ξ = 1 has its maximal eigenvalue greater than 1. This recaps the main result of percolation theory that the existence or not of an infinite connected cluster is directly related to whether or not the extinction probability vector is ξ < 1 or not. Since ξ is the least fixed point of G, this amounts to the existence or not of a nontrivial fixed point of the analytic function G : [0, 1] M → [0, 1] M . Our object now is to define how financial crises can be modelled as cascades on random financial networks. Percolation theory, as an abstract exploration of network connectivity, is a guide to understanding the susceptibility of such financial networks to cascades.
Default Cascades on IRFNs
The IRFN framework specifies the distributions of the random variables T, I,B,Ω just introduced. It provides a compact stochastic representation of the state of a given real world network of N banks at a moment in time prior to a crisis. With the same distributional data, we can consider this as an element of a sequence of networks by varying N and taking N → ∞. We now want to consider how such networks will respond when a trigger event at time t = 0 moves the pre-trigger balance sheetsB = [Ā,Ξ,∆] to the post-trigger balance sheets B (0) =B + δB (recall we assume Ω (0) =Ω).
Cascade mechanisms (CMs) are stylized behaviours that banks are assumed to follow when they become aware that a crisis has been triggered. These behaviours are highly nonlinear, to reflect that during a crisis banks will take emergency or remedial actions, and in the worst case of bankruptcy be taken over by a system regulator. "Business as usual", in which banks react smoothly to small changes as they pursue profits, is not applicable during the crisis. Instead we assume healthy banks that are solvent and liquid adopt a "do nothing/wait and see" crisis management strategy, while weak banks' behaviour may be forced or severely constrained by the regulatory structure. From a systemic perspective, cascades can arise when weak banks' behaviour have negative impact on other banks. Hurd (2018) provides an overview of some of the important cascade channels that model the forced behaviour of banks when their buffers fall below certain thresholds. For example, funding liquidity cascades arise when banks experience withdrawals by depositors or wholesale lenders. After n steps of the cascade their impacted cash buffers will be Ξ
denotes the liquidity shock transmitted from bank w hitting bank v. This section focuses instead on solvency cascades, which turn out to have the same mathematical structure as funding liquidity cascades. In this channel the most relevant buffer variable is the impacted solvency buffer after n cascade steps ∆
where S (n−1) wv denotes the solvency shock from w to v.
Default Cascade Mechanisms
We now consider a class of models generalizing the clearing model for defaulted debt of Eisenberg and Noe (2001) . The original EN model assumes that no bankruptcy charges are paid when a firm defaults, ruling out a dangerous contagion amplification mechanism. More realistically, bankruptcy charges and frictions will likely amount to a substantial effective cut of the firm's value at its default. Rogers and Veraart (2013) extend the EN model in this direction by assuming that bankruptcy costs given default are linear in the endowment and the recovery value of interbank assets. In their model, the recovery value is discontinuous in buffer variables at the solvency threshold, creating an effectively infinite shock amplification effect at this "hard threshold". In contrast, we make a "soft threshold" assumption where the recovery fraction on interbank debt is a continuous piecewise linear function of the level of insolvency.
Partial recovery of the notional value of the defaulted bank's assets will therefore be assumed to be distributed amongst creditors according to their seniority. Banks are assumed to have balance sheets as in Table 1 , and to be insolvent (bankrupt) if and only if ∆ < 0.
Assumption 3 (Fractional Recovery). For each bank, 1. External debt D is senior to interbank debt X and all interbank debt is of equal seniority;
2. Bankruptcy charges are in proportion to the negative part of the impacted solvency buffer.
Thus there is a fixed parameter λ ∈ (0, 1] assumed to be the same for all banks, such that at step n of the cascade bankruptcy costs = (1/λ − 1) max(−∆ (n) , 0) .
This assumption implies that the amount available to repay all debtors of a defaulted firm is TA − (1/λ − 1) max(−∆ (n) , 0). It means that as soon as ∆ (n) v ≤ −λX v , the recovery fraction paid on defaulted interbank debt will be zero.
In general, the loss fraction on interbank debt of each bank at step n can be identified as the insolvency level random variable defined by
The insolvency level of bank w at step n now influences the solvency shock transmitted to another bank v:
the aggregated solvency shock transmitted to v:
and finally, the solvency buffer of v at the end of step n:
Putting (17, 18, 19, 20) together gives the complete solvency cascade mapping at step n ≥ 0.
The First Cascade Step
Consider (18) for n = 0 defining the single shock S (X, Y, Z) where the shock transmission function G λ (x, y, z) = zg λ (y/(x + z)), g λ (u) = min (1, max(−u/λ, 0) ) .
( 21) depends on the independent random variables X = X 2\1 := w =1,2 I 2wΩ2w , Y := ∆ 
the Fourier transform of the conditional characteristic function of a particular random variable related to S (0) 21 . Proposition 4. The characteristic function of the solvency shock S (0) 21 transmitted from bank 2 to bank 1 in step 0, conditioned on the types T 1 = T, T 2 = T ′ , is given for finite N by
Proof. The proof works for any bounded shock transmission function G such that G(x, y, 0) = 0 and G(x, y, z)1(y ≥ 0) = 0. Since e ikG(X,Y,I 21Ω21 ) = 1+I 21 (e ikG(X,Y,Ω 21 ) −1) and (e ikG(X,Y,Ω 21 ) − 1)1(Y ≥ 0) = 0,
which by (22) and the Parseval-Plancherel identity in Fourier analysis yields the required result (23).
⊓ ⊔
While the proposition provides an abstract characterization of the result for general shock transmission functions G(X, Y, Z), we will also need explicit integral formulas for the specific function G λ given by (21) . Fix a = −y/λ and define
and note that R (N ) (k, a) = 0 for a ≤ 0. For a > 0, taking into account that P (N ) (X = 0) = 0, we can write
X (x)dx = 1 − P (N ) (X = 0). In the double integral we change integration variables to (x, u) ∈ R + × [0, a]. This has the inverse transformation
After some manipulation, this gives the formula R (N ) (k, a) = P (N ) (X = 0)P(Ω 21 > a)(e ika − 1)
Finally, we note that the distribution of X = X 2\1 for any N can be computed using Proposition 3 with a replacement of N by N −1, which leads to an explicit multi-dimensional integral for R (N ) (k, k ′ | T, T ′ ). We next consider the asymptotic distribution of the total solvency shock S (0)
transmitted to bank 1 in step 0. By a slight generalization of Lemma 2, one can argue that any finite collection of shocks {S (0) w1 } w =1 are identical, and asymptotically independent, conditioned on the type T 1 = T . However, this fact cannot prove the following plausible statement:
where ∼ represents the unproven step. Accepting this unproven step as true, and following the argument proving Proposition 1 leads to the following conjecture:
Conjecture 5. The characteristic function of the total solvency shock S
transmitted to bank 1 in step 0, conditioned on the type T 1 = T , has the N → ∞ limiting behaviour:
where R(k, a) is given by (24) with N = ∞ and the conditions T, T ′ .
An interpretation of this conjecture based on the formula (24) is that the solvency shock hitting bank v = 1 in step 0 is a non-negative Lévy distributed random variable. Moreover, the jump measure is a specific non-linear convolution of the three component probability density functions.
On the right side of equation (20) for the impacted default buffer ∆
at the end of step 0 we see directly that S (0) 1 and ∆ (0) 1 share no common balance sheet random variables, and are therefore independent conditionally on the type T of bank 1. From the multiplicative property of characteristic functions of sums of independent random variables, the impacted default buffer ∆
1 has the product conditional characteristic function f
In summary, step 0 of the solvency cascade mapping has been broken down into three substeps that capture the probabilistic implications of equations (18)-(20). Each of these substeps depends on the initial conditional distributional data for the collection {T v , I vw ,Ω vw , ∆ 
LTI Cascade Mechanisms
It turns out that Conjecture 5 is understandable from a different perspective if we consider the solvency cascade mapping on an IRFN, under the condition that the skeleton graph is a non-random, connected, directed tree. This alternative line of thinking is motivated because the skeleton of an IRFN is an IRG, which we have observed will always converge "locally weakly" to a random ensemble of connected components which are trees. We will now prove that the solvency cascade mapping on a skeleton which is a non-random, connected, directed tree has a nice property we call locally tree-like independent.
Let ([N] , E) denote the nodes and edges of such a tree skeleton, with node types labelled. Being a connected, directed tree, there is a partial ordering ≥, > generated by the relationships w > (wv) > v whenever (wv) ∈ E. Every element of ([N], E) is connected to a fixed node w by a unique path, whose final edge is either into or out of w. For any collection A of nodes and edges, we denote by σ(A) the sigma-algebra generated by the collection of random variables {∆ (0) u ,Ω wv } u,(wv)∈A . When ([N], E) arises from an IRFN on a tree, this is always a mutually independent collection. If A,B are disjoint subsets, then σ(A) and σ(B) are always independent. Now, for each u ∈ [N] and (wv) ∈ E we define some natural collections of random variables and their sigma-algebras.
1. M − u : the subset of ([N], E) whose elements are each connected to u by a path whose final edge is directed into u.
M +
u : the subset of ([N], E) whose elements are each connected to u by a path whose final edge is directed out of u.
M −
v\w : the subset of ([N], E) whose elements are each connected to v by a path whose final edge is directed into v, but is not the edge (wv).
M +
w\v : the subset of ([N], E) whose elements are each connected to w by a path whose final edge is directed out of w, but is not the edge (wv).
Note that the following are disjoint unions for all u ∈ [N], (wv) ∈ E:
Definition 2. A solvency cascade mechanism has the locally tree-like independent property if, conditioned on the skeleton being a non-random, connected, directed tree, ∆
Based on the independence of σ(A) and σ(B) whenever A,B are disjoint subsets, we can prove the LTI property of the EN solvency cascade mechanism with fractional recovery. Proposition 6. (LTI property of the solvency cascade mechanism) Consider an IRFN conditioned on a skeleton graph ([N], E) (or equivalently the realized random variables T, I) that is a non-random, connected, directed tree. Then the solvency cascade defined by (18)-(20) for any parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] is such that for all n ≥ 0 and (wv) ∈ E,
Proof. First we note that for any (wv) ∈ E,X w\v is M + w\v -measurable. Next note that ∆
This verifies the inductive step for n = k + 1, and hence the proposition is proven for all n ≥ 0. ⊓ ⊔ This proposition unravels the independence relationships across the entire family of balance sheet and exposure random variables that arise as the solvency cascade mapping is iterated. When the LTI property of the solvency cascade mechanism is combined with the fact that the infinite skeleton of an IRFN has components that are all random trees, it is not at all surprising that the large-N asymptotics of the cascade mapping is consistent with Conjecture 5. Moreover, since the LTI property extends for any finite number of cascade steps, we have confidence to the extend the conjecture to all higher orders in the cascade.
Higher Order Cascade Steps
The proposed solvency cascade dynamics is given by iterates n = 0, 1, 2, . . . of the mapping from ∆ (0) to ∆ (1) defined above, assuming the conjectured N = ∞ asymptotic approximation. This dynamics will take the probability distribution data for the collection {∆ v }, step n of the full cascade is therefore generated by the following algorithm.
The nonlinear mapping C : C 2L×M → C 2L×M is parametrized by the solvency cascade kernel R and the default buffer distribution f (0) , which, we can also note, must satisfy complex conjugation identities R(k, k ′ ) = R(−k, −k ′ ) and f (0) (k) = f (0) (−k). A single cascade step is thus of order O(L 2 × M 2 ) flops plus 2L × M ordinary exponentiations. In general, a cascade equilibrium is a fixed point f * of the mapping,
Implementing IRFNs
Consider a generic banking network for some country that consists ofN = T ∈[M ]N T banks classified into M types labelled by T ∈ [M], whereN T denotes the number of banks of type T . Suppose the interconnectivity, exposures and balance sheets of the network have been observed monthly for the past N m = 12 months. Bank type can be assumed not to change, but the connectivity and balance sheets will fluctuate over the period. The aim here is to construct a sequence of IRFNs of size N increasing to infinity, that is statistically consistent with the real world pre-crisis financial network when N =N . Then the statistical model for N = ∞ can be subjected to crisis triggers with any type of initial shock δB, and the resultant solvency cascade analytics developed in Section 3 will yield measures of the resilience of the real world network.
For any of the monthly observations of the network, directed edges are drawn between any ordered pair (v, w) of banks if the exposure of bank w to bank v exceeds a specified threshold (a "significant exposure"). LetÊ = T,T ′ÊT ,T ′ be the total number of significant exposures in the network identified in the N m = 12 month historical database, decomposed into a sum over the bank types involved. For each T → T ′ edge e ∈ [Ê T,T ′ ] we observe the value Ω e ; For each v ∈ [N m ×N T ] we also observe samples B v of the type T balance sheets. Our large N IRFN will be calibrated to this data.
Calibrating the Large N Model
The data described above leads to a natural calibration of the pre-trigger IRFN model for any value of N (including N = ∞) at any time in the near future. A bank v randomly selected from the empirical distribution will have type T with probability
.
∆ v ] will be drawn from the distribution whose empirical characteristic function iŝ
as a function of u ∈ R 3 + . A randomly selected pair of banks e = (v, w), v = w with types T, T ′ respectively will have a significant directed exposure, and hence a directed edge, with probability
where the matrix κ is called the empirical connection kernel. Finally, for each ordered pair T, T ′ we haveÊ T,T ′ observed significant exposures Ω e from a T bank to a T ′ bank, leading to the empirical characteristic function
Solvency cascade computations involve integrals over the u-variables, which must be approximated by finite sums obtained by truncation and discretization. This will lead essentially to the Fast Fourier Transform, which amounts to choosing a suitably small discretization parameter δ and large truncation value δL and computing each occurrence of (32) for the finite lattice u ∈ δ{−L + 1/2, −L + 3/2, . . . , L − 3/2, L − 1/2}.
The increasing sequence of random IRFN models based on these empirical probability distributions is intended to capture essential aspects of systemic risk in our specific finite real world network. For this to be true, a necessary condition to be verified will be that the N = ∞ solvency cascade analytics should also provide a reasonably accurate approximation to simulation results for finite N.
Parametrization Issues
There are several issues that need to be addressed by extensive experimentation when implementing such a scheme.
2. How many types of banks is ideal? Again, there is a tradeoff. Taking M sufficiently large is important because this is the parameter that determines how realistically the network correlation can be modelled. However, note that the computational burden increases and the power of the statistical estimation decreases with the number of types.
3. How large must N be chosen so that the asymptotic analysis is a good approximation? Likely, the accuracy of the large N approximation will deteriorate as the number of types increases. How sensitive is the accuracy of the LTI approximation (which relies to some extent on the sparsity of the network) to the choice of exposure threshold?
4. Where can one obtain the data required to calibrate IRFN models? Exposure data with identified counterparties is never publicly available, and currently is often not available even to regulators. So finding real world network data is a serious impediment to implementing any kind of financial network model.
Numerical Experiments
We have described how to implement a generic IRFN solvency cascade model from the point of view of someone with access to complete counterparty-counterparty exposure data. Since such detailed data rarely exists, and is never publicly available, a practical way to gain understanding of the IRFN is to follow the above implementation method for simulated network data. For example, Hurd et al. (2017) [Section 3.2] investigates zero-recovery solvency cascades in a stylized configuration graph random network with three bank types, that mimics certain characteristics of the US financial network. One can simulate such a model with N = 4000 banks (roughly the current number of banks in the US), over N m = 12 months, and follow the calibration method to match the resulting "synthetic" network data to the IRFN framework. Since the model of Hurd et al. (2017) 
Conclusion
This paper concerns itself only with general definitions, characteristics and properties of the IRFN cascade framework. Although the framework is designed to address any of a wide range of systemic risk effects for a wide range of real world financial networks, no attempt is made here to demonstrate its usefulness in actual specific contexts. It goes without saying that extensive and detailed numerical explorations of such implementations are needed to gain evidence that the IRFN method can be a useful and informative guide to understanding systemic risk. Fundamental questions of an implementation nature such as the accuracy of the large N approximations, the development of efficient computation schemes, large scale simulation experiments, and calibration to real network data, are very important but would amount to an enormous expansion of the scope of this paper, and by necessity are postponed to future works. As it stands, this paper provides a number of innovative mathematical ideas. The first is that the IRFN framework provides a flexible mathematical representation applicable to real world networks viewed at a suitably coarse grained scale. For example, it can provide a representation of the global financial network that can be useful in understanding SR spillovers between countries. Not only is the IRFN framework versatile, it possesses an underlying mathematical structure called the "locally tree-like independence property" that means large N asymptotic formulas for the network can be related to an associated Galton-Watson branching process. Some of the mathematical details of this type of "percolation theory" remain conjectural, and open to future research.
A second innovation is the analysis of the EN 2001 default modelling cascade mechanism, and its generalizations, within the IRFN framework. It is shown that these mechanisms possess a related kind of LTI property, that in essence unravels the dependence structure of the sequence of balance sheet random variables arising from the cascade mapping, under the condition that the skeleton connection graph is a random tree. This property motivates the large N cascade mapping formulas and fixed point equilibrium condition derived in the paper that dramatically extend rigorous large N results of Amini et al. (2016) and Detering et al. (2017) , but whose proof remains another open problem for research. As noted in those works, the biggest conceptual advantage of closed analytical cascade mapping formulas such as these is to provide measures of resilience of the network that depend only on a reduced set of relevant model parameters.
A third important contribution is the extension of random financial networks to involve quite general classes of distributions, such as inhomogeneous random exposures and balance sheets. Moreover, the solvency cascade mapping analysis extends naturally in this wider setting, leading to a remarkably compact formula (30).
Perhaps the key obstacle in systemic risk research is the strategic value and importance of counterparty data that makes it extremely confidential, to the extent that collaboration between countries may seem to be impossible. A fourth contribution of the paper, the calibration method outlined in Section 4, addresses this issue. This method relies only on aggregated data that is naturally anonymized, which makes shared calibration exercises possible when implementing a carefully designed global IRFN model.
Future work on the foundations of the IRFN approach, as opposed to the implementation issues mentioned above, may take several directions. One way to go is to intertwine solvency shocks with funding liquidity shocks as well as indirect channels of contagion. With two or more of the channels of systemic risk, the LTI property of the cascade mechanism seems to fail, complicating the large N limit analysis. Another type of extension is to add node types for financial institutions such as hedge funds, firms, central clearinghouses, central banks etc. This can be implemented within the IRFN framework, introducing another dimension of complexity. A third type of extension will be to make the exposures have the meaning of cash, collateral and other types of contract.
In a nutshell, this paper provides a flexible and convenient framework with many potential applications to systemic risk. However, proving the value of the IRFN approach will depend most heavily on the results that compare cascade simulations to analytic cascade formulas, for network models calibrated to reflect the properties of real world financial systems.
